Reply to Bender by Post, Robert C.
REPLY TO BENDER
Robert C. Post
Paul Bender has interesting and telling points to make, but a good
many of them do not concern the paper I have actually published in this
volume (or my work generally).
Bender cogently argues, for example, that because democratic self-
governance is not "the only reason for protecting speech in a democracy,"'
"public discourse . . . is clearly not the entire realm of constitutionally
protected free expression, nor should it be."2 I quite agree with Bender on
this point, and I have never anywhere argued anything to the contrary.
Indeed, I explicitly observe in my contribution to this volume that the theory
of the "marketplace of ideas," which is limited to neither public discourse
nor democracy, "does constitute a significant presence in First Amendment
jurisprudence. "
3
The position that I actually defend is quite different from that
attributed to me by Bender. It is that the value of democratic self-goverance
is the most powerful explanation of the general pattern of First Amendment
decisions (and most particulary of its nationally idiosyncratic aspects), and
that democratic self-governance is the only value that can convincingly
account for the specific set of decisions protecting the abusive, outrageous
and indecent speech that are of most concern in this Symposium.
Bender also attacks the claim that the First Amendment does or
should require "absolute protection for speech within 'public discourse.'" 4
Of course Bender is completely correct to reject such a silly claim. I would
only observe that this claim has nothing whatever to do with anything I have
written, here or anywhere else. I argue instead that the First Amendment
1. Paul Bender, Comment on Robert C. Post's 'Community and the First Amendment," 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 485, 488 (1997).
2. d. at 492.
3. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 479
(1997).
4. Bender, supra note 1, at 486.
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suspends the enforcement within public discourse of civility rules, 5 which I
have defined as legally enforced community norms that constitute individual
and collective identity.
I appreciate that the distinction between regulations that enforce
civility rules and other kinds of regulations is not obvious. That is why I
warned at the outset of my comment that in a short presentation directed to a
partly lay audience, I would not be able to spell out the full implications of
my argument. By way of compensation, however, I invited readers who
were interested to review several articles where I had the space to work out
these ideas with some care. 7  Bender apparently did not accept this
invitation, for in these articles I explicitly discuss some of the very kinds of
regulations that he now taxes me with overlooking. For example I argue at
length that the regulation of false facts within public discourse does not
8constitute the enforcement of a civility rule.
Had Bender accepted my invitation, he also would have seen that I
attempt to answer many of the other (good) questions that he asks. For
example I try to define the nature and boundaries of public discourse. 9 I
argue, for instance, that public discourse cannot possibly include student
speech within schools, because such expression occurs within a "managerial
domain" and hence is confined by the instrumental necessity of achieving
given educational objectives.10 Of course Bender might reject any or all of
5. My argument includes the proviso that the First Amendment will permit the enforcement
of civility rules if such enforcement is necessary to preserve "the very ability of public discourse to
continue to function as a form of public deliberation." Post, supra note 3, at 483. Since I explicitly
argue for this proviso and attempt to theorize its necessity, I am puzzled by Bender's seizing upon it
as an apparent example of inadvertent internal inconsistency.
6. Id. at 475-76.
7. Id. at 474.
8. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601,
649-66 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse]. Some of the counter-examples proposed by
Bender raise the important distinction between regulation to enforce civility rules, where harm is
understood to result from the very fact of the violation of the rule, and regulation to prevent harms
that are only contingently related to liability standards. On this distinction, see id. at 616-24; see
also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution,
74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693-721, 726-31 (1986); Robert C. Post, Blasphemy, The First Amendment
and the Concept of Intrinsic Harm, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. IN L. 293, 320-24 (1988).
9. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 8, at 667-84.
10. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164-67 (1996); Robert C.
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 317-25
(1990); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1765-97 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Governance and
Management]. The same might be said of Bender's inquiries concerning speech that occurs within
town meetings and legislative bodies. I have explicitly argued that speech in such settings should
not be regarded as public discourse. See id. at 1799-80; Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake:
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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these ideas, but at least he would then have some idea of the general
contours of the actual position he is concerned to dismiss.
Bender is correct to characterize my essay as advocating the position
that constitutional protections for speech depend upon the social domain in
which speech occurs. Bender rejects this position on the basis of three
arguments. The first evokes the text of the First Amendment, which Bender
reads as a "broad injunction that Congress make no law 'abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.'" 1 1 This injunction, says Bender, is
uniform; it contains no limitions or exceptions, such as my position would
require.
Everyone agrees, however, that the First Amendment will permit
some regulations of speech, while it will forbid others. This means that any
plausible theory of the First Amendment will narrow the "broad injunction"
of the constitutional text. Bender himself apparently advocates a First
Amendment jurisprudence that focuses on the concept of harm, but such a
jurisprudence would itself be inconsistent with Bender's textual argument.
To paraphrase Bender's own language, the First Amendment does not read:
"Speech that is not very harmful being constitutionally necessary, Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of such speech." The larger point,
of course, is that the constitutional text is so general, elusive and delphic that
it is not of much use in any serious effort to construe First Amendment
jurisprudence.
The second argument advanced by Bender turns on an empirical
assertion. Bender charges that First Amendment jurisprudence does not in
fact have the shape that my theory would predict. Indeed Bender claims to
"have a difficult time thinking of any examples of speech that is protected
when it is part of 'public discourse' but is not at least equally well (indeed,
probably better) protected when it appears in a non-public communication on
non-public subjects that have nothing to do with the 'formation of public
opinion.'"' 2
This empirical argument is simply wrong. Bender himself discusses
an example of speech that is better protected within public discourse than
outside of it, for he acknowledges, as he must, that within public discourse
defamatory statements receive "extra protection."1 3 As Bender undoubtedly
also knows, the same could be said of speech that violates the other
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111-19
(1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake]. The courts have evidently agreed. White v. City
of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1990).
11. Bender, supra note 1, at 488.
12. Id. at 487.
13 . Id. at 491.
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"dignitary" torts that enforce civility rules. The tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, for instance, is subject to strict constitutional
restrictions within public discourse, but not within nonpublic discourse.
14
Even in his short text, Bender indicates awareness of other examples of this
phenomenon, as for instance that "lewd" speech cannot be prohibited within
public discourse,15 but that it can be forbidden within the nonpublic
discourse of a school. 16
If Bender had given the issue a little more thought, he could have
come up with innumerable other examples. Content and viewpoint
discrimination, prior restraints, and administrative discretion are all strongly
discouraged within public discourse, but not within managerial domains.
The state may not set the agenda of public discourse, 18 but it routinely does
so for speech within managerial domains. 19 Within public discourse "there
is no such thing as a false idea," 20 but within nonpublic discourse we do
penalize false ideas (characterizing them as, for example, medical or legal
malpractice). And so forth.
The third argument advanced by Bender is that because the First
Amendment protects expression generally, constitutional safeguards should
not depend upon the social domain of speech. 21 Bender acknowledges, of
course, that some regulations of speech are constitutionally permissible,
while others are not. But he believes that these distinctions can best be
captured by a First Amendment jurisprudence that focuses on harm. "It is
thus the harmful result of speech and the culpability of the speaker in relation
to that harm-not the topic of the speech or its lack of a general audience-
that is the primary reason why the Constitution does not protect some
speech. "22
While this approach to First Amendment jurisprudence certainly
deserves respectful attention, and while harm certainly must be an important
factor in any understanding of the First Amendment, I do not believe that
Bender's approach can carry us very far. States only seek to regulate speech
14. Compare Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), with Contreras v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977).
15. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
16. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
17. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 10, at 164-67; Post, Governance and
Management, supra note 10, at 1767-809.
18. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980).
19. See Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 10, at 1114-23.
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
21. For a detailed argument against this position, see Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995).
22. Bender, supra note 1, at 489.
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that they deem to be harmful. To be useful, therefore, a harm-based
approach to the First Amendment must distinguish between harms that can
constitutionally be regulated and those that cannot. A crude spectrum of
harms from "greater" to "lesser" will not help much, for the concept of
harm is not continous and quantifiable in this way. We need instead some
way of qualitatively distinguishing among kinds of harms.
Some efforts to supply such distinctions are simply circular, as for
example when it is said that speech causing crimes can be prohibited. It is
precisely the task of the First Amendment to determine which crimes can
constitutionally be enforced. Other efforts to explain these distinctions are
merely fatuous, as for example when Bender remarks that if certain harms
were permitted to justify regulation "the 'freedom' of expression would
become largely illusory. " 23 It is precisely the task of First Amendment
theory to explain what "the freedom of expression" is and why the
regulation of certain harms (but not others) is constitutionally impermissible.
Obviously a theory narrowly focused on harm cannot itself do this. What is
needed instead is a theory of "the freedom of expression."
The task of any theory of freedom of expression is to explain why
we protect speech. Any such explanation will have implications for what
social consequences can constitutionally be recognized as harmful. False
ideas are not constitutionally recognized as causing harm within public
discourse because persons within that discourse are presumed to be
autonomous and independent; but false ideas are deemed capable of causing
compensable harms within doctor-patient relationships because persons in
that context are presumed to be trusting and dependent. This difference is
also why, contrary to Bender's assertion, negligent speech "that proximately
causes personal injury" 24 is often protected within public discourse, although
25it is typically regulated outside of public discourse. The point of these
examples is that any notion of harm must be at least in part theory-
dependent.
It follows that harm-based accounts of the First Amendment are
inherently incomplete. Without an explanation of the constitutional values
served by freedom of expression, such accounts cannot comprehend the
theory-dependent aspects of the concept of harm. But purely harm-based
accounts of the First Amendment are also inadequate for another and more
far-reaching reason. Even those harms (like murder) that may plausibly be
regarded as theory-independent require assessment in light of their potential
23. Id. at 490.
24. Id. at 489.
25. See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1991).
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impairment of relevant constitutional values. We need to weigh such harms
against the effect of their suppression on constitutional purposes. We cannot
conduct such an evaluation based on a purely harm-based account of the
First Amendment.
At best, therefore, focusing on harm can provide only half a story.
The other half must come from a fully developed theory of the purposes of
the First Amendment and of the Constitution generally. I have argued
elsewhere, and will not repeat those arguments here, that any such theory
cannot apply uniformly over the social field. 26  Particular constitutional
values will carry distinctive force in some dimensions of social life, but not
in others. And this, fundamentally, is why First Amendment protections for
speech depend upon the social domain in which speech occurs.
26. See generally Post, supra note 21.
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